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FRIENDS WITH BENEFITS:
REDEFINING PERSONAL GAIN IN
INSIDER TRADING UNDER
SALMAN V. UNITED STATES
WENDY R. BECKER*
INTRODUCTION
With Martha Stewart, Mark Cuban, and Phil Mickelson, insider
trading investigations have become a high profile form of corporate
crime.1 With stories full of interesting characters, it is not hard to see
why this problem has caught the public’s eye. Examples of these stories
range from the sympathetic, like Rajat Gupta, the sixty-three-year-old
retiree who started with nothing,2 to the shameless, like Gupta’s tippee,
Raj Rajaratnam, the billionaire investor whose entire business was
based on receiving tips from those close to his company and teaching
them to conceal those tips.3 Prosecutions and public attention focused
on insider trading have seen an unprecedented rise in the last few
decades.4 Scholars have attributed the proliferation of these cases as a
“symptom of cancerous greed on Wall Street.”5 However, Congress has
failed to enact a statute outlawing any form of insider trading outright.6
Rather, prosecutors are forced to rely on the general fraud statutes,
Copyright © 2016 Wendy R. Becker.
*
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1. Stephen Clark, Insider Trading and Financial Economics: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 16 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 43, 45 (2010) (discussing how insider trading has captured the
attention of the academy and the public).
2. Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Rajat Gupta Convicted of Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2012), http://www.dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/rajat-gupta-convicted-of-insidertrading/.
3. Anna Driggers, Raj Rajaratnam’s Historic Insider Trading Sentence, 49 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 2021, 2028 (2012).
4. Charles C. Cox & Keven S. Fogerty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L. J.
353, 353 (1988).
5. Id.
6. Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 179–80 (1991) (explaining the ambiguity in insider trading
regulations and how to combat them).
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such as Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule 10b-5.7 As a result,
there continues to be some ambiguity as to what constitutes insider
trading and how to combat the use of material, nonpublic information
to deceive counterparties in these deals.
Following contentious litigation and investigations by the SEC, the
Supreme Court held in Dirks v. SEC8 that a fiduciary duty is breached
when the insider privy to the information receives a “personal
benefit.”9 However, confusion still surrounds this pronouncement, and
courts remain divided on what is required to constitute a personal
benefit. The Court granted certiorari in United States v. Salman to
clarify whether the personal benefit must be a pecuniary gain, as the
Second Circuit determined in United States v. Newman,10 or if the
insider can personally benefit in other ways in order to uphold insider
trading convictions.11
This commentary argues that the Court should interpret the
personal benefit standard in Dirks to constitute two possibilities: (1) a
quid pro quo relationship; and (2) when the relationship between the
tipper and tippee is so clear that the tipper inherently does receive a
benefit by providing material nonpublic information to the tippee. It
proceeds in the following parts. Part I summarizes the factual and
procedural background in Salman. Part II explains the legal
background of insider trading. Part III presents the Ninth Circuit’s
holding and rationale in Salman. Part IV explores the parties’
arguments. Part V analyzes how the Supreme Court should rule on
Salman based on the holdings in Dirks, Newman, and the decisions
below.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2002, Maher Kara began working for Citigroup in its healthcare
investment banking group.12 Throughout the next few years, Maher
sought help from his brother Michael Kara to better understand the
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008).
8. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
9. Id. at 664.
10. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
11. See Salman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 899, 899 (2016) (granting certiorari to question
one in the Petition).
12. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 2, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628
(2015) [hereinafter Brief for the United States in Opposition].
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science behind his work.13 By 2004, Maher was sharing confidential
information about Citigroup’s practices.14 From 2004 to 2007, Maher
knowingly disclosed information about upcoming mergers and
acquisitions by Citigroup clients.15 Maher suspected that Michael was
trading on the information, but Michael denied it.16
Maher and Michael were extremely close.17 Michael helped pay
Maher’s college tuition and took on the role of their deceased father at
Maher’s wedding.18 Maher testified that he gave Michael the
information to benefit Michael by “getting him off my back, and
fulfilling whatever needs he had.”19
In 2003, Maher became engaged to Petitioner Bassam Yacoub
Salman’s sister.20 The families became extremely close.21 In the fall of
2004, Michael began to share the trading tips he was receiving from
Maher with Salman.22 Salman decided not to set up his own brokerage
account, and instead arranged transfers into an account held jointly
under the name of his wife’s sister and her husband, Karim Bayyouk.23
Salman shared the information he learned with Bayyouk, and the two
split the profits.24 The account ultimately grew from $396,000 to
approximately $2.1 million; Salman and Bayyouk earned
approximately $1.7 million.25
According to Michael’s testimony, Salman knew that Maher was
the source of the trading information.26 Michael testified that he
“directly” told Salman, and that the two agreed “they had to ‘protect’
Maher and promised to shred all of the papers.”27 Furthermore, there
was evidence that Salman knew how close the relationship was
between the two brothers.28

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628 (2015)
[hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1090.
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On September 1, 2011, Salman was indicted for one count of
conspiracy to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and
four counts of securities fraud in violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5.29 The jury found Salman guilty on all five counts.30
Salman was sentenced to thirty-six months in prison followed by three
years of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution of
$738,539.42.31
Salman moved for a new trial,32 and his post-conviction motions
were denied.33 The Ninth Circuit affirmed Salman’s convictions,
holding that “there can be no question that, under Dirks, the evidence
was sufficient for the jury to find that Maher disclosed the information
in breach of his fiduciary duties and that [Salman] knew as much.”34 On
November 10, 2015, Salman filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.35 The petition sought review on two issues: (1) Under
Dirks, does the personal benefit to the insider need to be pecuniary or
is a familial relationship enough; and (2) Can failure to investigate
where the tip came from constitute willful blindness?36 On January 19,
2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the first issue.37
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Securities fraud derives from statute. The Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were enacted in direct response to
the 1929 crash and subsequent depression.38 Fears of excessive
speculation and another market crash fueled the public’s desire for
reform.39

29. Id. at 1088.
30. Id. at 1090.
31. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 12, at 2.
32. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015).
33. United States v. Salman, No. CR–11–0625, 2013 WL 6655176, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17,
2013).
34. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092.
35. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19.
36. Id. at i.
37. See Salman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 899, 899 (2016).
38. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385, 408 (1990).
39. Id. at 409.
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Courts have read a prohibition against insider trading into § 10(b)
of the Exchange Act,40 which provides a “catch-all” method to combat
securities fraud.41 The SEC then promulgated Rule 10b-5, which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.42

Neither the statute nor the rule specifically prohibit insider
trading.43 However, the illegality of insider training is predicated on the
idea that it is securities fraud under Rule 10b-5.44 Like securities fraud,
insider trading is also a breach of a fiduciary duty.45 Under Rule 10b-5,
the person who bears this duty misleads either the opposing party of
the transaction or the shareholders by trading on the information.46 The
Supreme Court has determined that Rule 10b-5 must be understood to
prevent insider trading based on the idea that traders who have access
to information for corporate purposes (nonpublic information) may
not take advantage of the information, which is unavailable to the other
side.”47 Therefore, the informed person has an obligation to disclose the
information or not trade.48

40. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008).
41. Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(B) and Rule 10B-5: The Continued Validity
of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchase-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 843
(2009).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
43. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014).
44. Id.
45. J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading: United States v. Newman and the
Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 6 (2015).
46. Willis W. Hagen II, Insider Trading Under Rule 10b-5: The Theoretical Bases for
Liability, 44 THE BUS. LAW. 13, 15 (1988).
47. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
48. Hagen, supra note 46, at 15.
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The scope of insider trading hinges on definitions contained in the
statute and the regulation. An “insider” is defined as a director, officer,
or principal stockholder under Section 16 of the Exchange Act.49 Rule
10b-5 is applicable not only to “insiders,” but also to anyone with
material, nonpublic information.50
Congress and the SEC do not provide a definition of “material,
nonpublic information.”51 However, courts have typically held that
unlawful insider trades occur when trades are made immediately prior
to the disclosure of corporate takeovers, earnings announcements, or
dividend announcements.52 The SEC defines “nonpublic information”
as information that investors “may not lawfully acquire without the
consent of the source,” or information that has not been made available
to investors generally.53 The Second Circuit defines material
information as “those facts which affect the probable future of the
company[,] and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy,
sell, or hold the company’s securities.”54
Proponents of criminalizing insider trading argue that it is unfair to
consumers and “undermines public confidence in capital markets.”55
According to the Supreme Court, an animating purpose behind the
enactment of the Exchange Act was “to insure honest securities
markets and thereby promote investor confidence.”56 Advocates also
claim that this conduct allows traders to profit from corporate
misfortune, or that it allows insiders to divert profits from shareholders
to themselves.57
B. Common Law Insider Trading and the “Personal Benefit”
Requirement
The first time that insider trading was considered a form of
securities fraud was in the SEC investigation’s In re Cady, Roberts &
49. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2011).
50. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848.
51. Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Defining “Material, Nonpublic”: What Should
Constitute Illegal Insider Trading Information?, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 327, 342 (2016).
52. Id.
53. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 322 n.2 (1979).
54. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849.
55. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 858 (1983).
56. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997).
57. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 55, at 858.
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Co.58 The SEC ruled that insider trading was defined by two elements:
(1) “the existence of a relationship giving access directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone[,]” and (2) “the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”59 Seven
years later, the Second Circuit ruled in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.60
that the SEC’s understanding of insider trading in Cady, Roberts was
correct.61 The court then explained that the congressional purpose
behind Rule 10b-5 was that investors should have equal access to
information, rewards, and risks of securities markets.62
In 1983, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dirks v. SEC.63
Raymond Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer firm when
he received information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity
Funding of America, who alleged that the company’s assets were
overvalued due to fraudulent practices.64 Dirks investigated the
allegations, and while senior management denied the misconduct,
employees of the corporation corroborated the story.65 Dirks urged
William Blundell at the Wall Street Journal’s Los Angeles office to
write a story on the fraud, but Blundell did not believe such a massive
fraud could be occurring and turned down the story.66 While Dirks
continued to investigate, he told people about Secrist’s allegations.67
Those people then traded based on the information, and Equity
Funding stock prices fell dramatically.68 The SEC convicted Dirks for
aiding and abetting the fraud.69 The Supreme Court overturned his
conviction and ruled that Dirks had no duty to abstain from use of the
inside information that he obtained.70
Under the “classical theory” of insider trading, anyone in
possession of material, nonpublic information about a corporation

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
Id. at 912.
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 852.
Id.
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Id. at 648–49.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 649–50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 665.
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cannot trade on this information, or the information needs to be
disclosed to the party on the other side of the trade.71 This can be true
if the person who has the information (the “insider”) trades, or if the
insider becomes a “tipper” and gives the information to another (the
“tippee”) who trades.72 It is also possible to have “tipping chains.”73
In Dirks, the Court established the modern requirements for
tipper/tippee liability under this classical framework.74 The Court held
that (1) the insider must breach her fiduciary duty to shareholders; and
(2) the tippee must know, or should know, that the breach occurred.75
The Supreme Court concluded that a tippee does not inherit a duty to
“disclose or abstain” automatically.76 The Court held that two elements
establish a violation of Rule 10b-5: “(i) the existence of a relationship
affording access to inside information intended to be available only for
a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without
disclosure.”77
However, the Court also held that not every breach of fiduciary
duty falls under Rule 10b-5.78 The Court recognizes, as does the SEC,
the vital role that market analysts play in the “preservation of a healthy
market,” and that this role would be inhibited if prosecutions could
occur when there is any disparity of information.79 Accordingly, the
Court determined that tippees assume an insider’s duty to the
shareholders when the information is obtained improperly.80 The Court
determined that the intent behind Rule 10b-5 was to eliminate the
71. David T. Cohen, Old Rule, New Theory: Revising the Personal Benefit Requirement for
Tipper/Tippee Liability Under the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 47 B.C. L. REV.
547, 552–53 (2006).
72. See id. at 554 (stating that liability under the classical theory occurs when a person is an
insider or the tippee of an insider).
73. This occurs when A (the tipper) gives information to B (tippee 1) and B gives that
information to C (tippee 2), C can be liable, as long as C had reason to know that A (the source
of the information) breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing it the first time. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of Insider Trading: A Comprehensive Primer 20 (Mar. 13,
2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=261277. See, e.g.,
United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d
438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014).
74. Cohen, supra note 71, at 558.
75. Id. at 558–59.
76. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
77. Id. at 653–54 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980)).
78. Id. at 654 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)).
79. See id. at 658.
80. See id. at 660.

BECKER WORD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

FRIENDS WITH BENEFITS

12/1/2016 1:00 PM

55

ability of individuals to obtain a “personal advantage” through the use
of inside information.81 Therefore, the test for inside-trading liability is
“whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from
his disclosure.”82 When the individual privy to the inside information
obtains no personal benefit, the duty to shareholders has not been
breached.83 This is the issue that the Court must further define in
Salman.
C. The Circuit Split
Circuits are currently divided on when a personal benefit to the
insider may be inferred from a personal relationship between the tipper
and tippee. The Second and Ninth Circuits diverge as discussed below.
The Second Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks
to United States v. Newman.84 Newman and Chiasson, two portfolio
managers, were convicted of securities fraud.85 The Second Circuit
vacated the convictions and remanded the case to dismiss the
indictments.86
The parties did not dispute that Chiasson and Newman knew
almost nothing about the insiders nor any personal benefit the insiders
may have received.87 The Second Circuit found that if there was a
benefit in this case, then “practically anything would qualify.”88 One
tipper received career advice from a tippee.89 The other tipper only
knew a tippee from church, and they occasionally socialized together.90
Therefore, the Government’s evidence was insufficient to prove a
personal benefit in order to establish tipper liability, so Chiasson and
Newman could not be liable as tippees.91

81. Id. at 662 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
85. Id. at 442.
86. Id. at 455.
87. Id. at 453.
88. Id. at 452.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 451. However, in a prior case, the Second Circuit broadly defined “personal
benefit” and held that “it includes not only ‘pecuniary gain,’ such as a cut of the take or a gratuity
from the tippee, but also a ‘reputational benefit’ or the benefit one would obtain from simply
‘mak[ing] a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.’” SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d
276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983)).
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Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, in this case, held that the personal
benefit element of the breach of fiduciary duty was satisfied when the
“insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative
or friend.’”92 The Ninth Circuit held that reading Newman as requiring
the tipper to receive a tangible benefit, and that the tippee knows about
it, contradicted Dirks.93 It also pointed out that Newman recognized
personal benefit as including the benefit of gifting confidential
information to a friend.94
III. HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Salman’s conviction.95 The court held
that the evidence was “more than sufficient for a rational jury to find
both that the inside information was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary
duty, and that Salman knew of that breach at the time he traded on it.”96
The court interpreted “personal benefit” to include an insider
gifting confidential information to a trading relative or friend.97 The
Government provided evidence that Maher breached his fiduciary
duty when he disclosed nonpublic information in exchange for
education and to further their relationship. 98 It is unclear if Salman
knew the entire history or extent of Maher and Michael’s relationship,
but it is uncontroverted that Salman knew the brothers were close.99
Therefore, Salman knew that Maher gave the information to Michael
intending to benefit his relative.100 The court held that this relationship
was sufficient grounds to establish a personal benefit; that Maher
breached his fiduciary duty for this relationship; and that Salman’s
knowledge of this relationship and the breach was sufficient to affirm
his conviction.101

92.
664).
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at
Id.
Id. at 1093–94 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452).
Id. at 1094.
Id.
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1094.
Id.
Id.
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IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Salman’s Arguments
Salman argues that the Court’s test under Dirks has not been met
because the Government did not prove that the disclosure by the
insider (Maher) was motivated by pecuniary gain.102 Therefore, no
fiduciary duty was breached.103 Furthermore, Salman argues a broader
construction of insider trading liability, where no pecuniary gain occurs,
violates the Constitution.104
Salman’s argument is three-pronged. First, the Government’s
theory of tippee liability contradicts the Court’s precedent and is not
supported by the language or legislative history of Section 10(b).105
Second, since Section 10(b) does not explicitly prohibit insider trading,
the rule of lenity requires the common law doctrine be narrowly
construed.106 Third, Salman’s conviction does not meet the Court’s
pecuniary gain standard.107
First, Salman argues that the Government is attempting to rewrite
the definition of insider trading by vastly expanding tippee liability, in
complete disregard for the Court’s precedent and the language and
history of Section 10(b).108 He claims that the Government is
attempting to replace the “personal benefit” test that the Supreme
Court provided in Dirks with a “‘lack of corporate purpose’ test:
knowingly trading on material nonpublic information would be
criminal whenever an insider disclosed the information ‘for personal,
rather than corporate, reasons.’”109
Salman also argues that the Government’s arguments are
inconsistent with the text and history of Section 10(b). Section 10(b)
contains no language specifically outlawing insider trading, unlike
other countries that have outlawed the practice.110 Salman points out
that both the statute and legislative history are ambiguous, so courts
created liability based on judicial interpretations and SEC

102. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 24, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628 (2016)
[hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner].
103. See id. at 4.
104. Id. at 26.
105. See id. at 24.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 8.
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administrative decisions.111 Similarly, the drafters of the Exchange Act
were aware of inside trading, but did not address the subject or intend
for Section 10(b) to determine its illegality.112
Next, Salman argues that the Government switched its theory upon
appeal when it realized its original theory was too vague.113 Originally,
the Government argued that gifting a tip to a friend or relative was a
benefit to the tipper.114 According to Salman, this theory violates due
process because it fails to state what relationships are sufficiently close
to automatically give off a personal benefit and it does not identify
what a disclosure must consist of to constitute a gift.115 Now, Salman
claims the Government presents a new theory to the Court: that the tip
will be a breach of fiduciary duty if it does not coincide with a corporate
purpose.116 Salman argues that under this new test, there would be no
need to ask what benefits are sufficient, or to examine the relationship
between the tipper and tippee, because any relationship would lead to
liability.117
Second, Salman argues that since Section 10(b) does not expressly
prohibit insider trading, courts must construe the statute narrowly.118
The Constitution vests the power to define crimes solely with the
legislature.119 Since Congress has not made policy decisions to explicitly
codify insider trading, the common-law doctrine is ambiguous.120
Therefore, until Congress enacts legislation on the matter, the crime
should be narrowly construed in courts’ application.121 The
Government, specifically the SEC, has hesitated to create any bright
line rule so that investors are not given reign to trade legally using
nonpublic information.122 Salman argues that the Government has tried
to prosecute corporate crime using “seemingly indeterminate language
to usurp the power to define the crime” until the Court holds the
111. See id. at 9 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980)).
112. Brief of Amicus Curiae Mark Cuban in Support of Petitioner at 4, United States v.
Salman, No. 15-628 (2016) (quoting Donald Cook & Myer Feldman, Insider Trading Under the
Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 386 (1953)).
113. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 13.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 14.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 15.
119. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
120. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 15.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 16–17.
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Government in check.123 According to Salman, until Congress “enacts
a statute identifying [the] elements [of insider trading], courts lack the
appropriate tools to implement the will of Congress.”124 The pecuniary
gain standard provides an unambiguous test.125 Salman defines
pecuniary gain as “broker commissions or other compensation, not
some intangible benefit.”126
Third, Salman argues that the Government’s argument cannot
stand under the pecuniary gain standard because Maher had no
financial incentive to release the information.127 Even if the Court were
to accept a “lack of corporate purpose” theory, Salman argues his
conviction should be overturned because the jury was never instructed
on this rule.128
B. The Government’s Arguments
The Government argues that there is “overwhelming” evidence of
Section 10(b) liability, including personal benefit to the tipper, and the
petitioner’s knowledge of this benefit.129 The Government’s argument
rests on three ideas. First, the personal benefit standard in Dirks creates
liability when a tipper acts for her own benefit instead of the
corporation.130 Second, stare decisis requires the court to uphold, rather
than reconsider the standard in Dirks.131 Finally, the Government did
not create a new federal crime with insider trading, rather it defined a
crime that was already prohibited by Section 10(b).132 The heart of the
Government’s argument is that “[t]he tipper’s purpose, rather than the
identity of the recipient, is dispositive.”133
The Government argues that “[t]he existence of [a] ‘personal
benefit’ is simply the flip side of the absence of a corporate purpose.”134
The personal benefit test is fulfilled when the tipper discloses

123. Id. at 18.
124. Id. at 22.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 5 (parentheses omitted).
127. Id. at 24.
128. Id.
129. Brief for the United States at 54–55, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628 (2016)
[hereinafter Brief for the United States].
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 42.
134. Id. at 19.

BECKER WORD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

60

12/1/2016 1:00 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 12

information for personal rather than corporate reasons.135 The
Government reasons that whenever an insider discloses nonpublic
information, he breaches his fiduciary duty by “inherently act[ing]
contrary to a corporate purpose, to the detriment of shareholders.”136
In this case, the Government analogizes insider trading to
embezzlement, arguing that the criminal act is “the embezzler’s use of
the property—here, confidential information—not for the purposes for
which it was entrusted, but for the person’s own purposes.”137 The
Government further pointed to the Court’s use of “trading relative or
friend” in Dirks to exemplify personal, as opposed to corporate
purposes.138
Next, the Government argues that stare decisis and Congress’s
endorsement mean that the Court should uphold Dirks’ standard.139
Salman’s argument lacks merit because the Court itself states “that
personal benefit includes things ‘such as pecuniary gain’. . . [and] then
goes on to list a number of other forms of benefit that qualify.”140
Furthermore, a pecuniary gain standard would create new ambiguities
regarding the timing of the gain, the amount of money that triggers
these protections, and whether the money needs to be received or can
be expected.141 Salman has not addressed any of these questions.142 The
Government also argues that the Second Circuit was “erroneous” in
Newman, and that this represents the sole example of a misapplication
of Dirks.143 Therefore, the standard is not ambiguous.
Finally, the Government claims that insider trading’s illegality
comes directly from Section 10(b)’s language.144 Section 10(b) is
intentionally broad, in order to capture various and new forms of
securities fraud.145 The Court has created a limiting principle by
recognizing that the insider must violate a duty for the conduct to be
135. Id. at 18.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 23.
138. Id. at 27.
139. Id. at 29.
140. Id. at 34 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983)).
141. Id. at 34–35.
142. Id. at 37–38, 38 n.6.
143. Id. at 39.
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008) (It is unlawful “to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange . . . any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe. . . .”).
145. Brief for the United States, supra note 129, at 46.
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fraudulent.146 The Government argues that accepting the pecuniary
gain rule would absolve liability from any insider that gifts information
to his relatives or friends so long as she can show she did not receive a
pecuniary return.147
The Government also makes a policy argument that eliminating the
use of material, non-public information is “vital to investor
confidence.”148 If disparity of information becomes a “rigged game,”
people will refuse to invest because they will not trust the market.149
Therefore, allowing a pecuniary benefit standard undermines Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.150 Such a test defeats the purpose of insider
trading laws, and individuals will stop investing if they perceive markets
are no longer fair.151
V. ANALYSIS
The Court should hold for the Government. The Court should rule
as follows: the information disclosed by Maher was a breach of
fiduciary duty, for which he received a personal benefit; Salman knew
that Maher breached his duty and that the information was nonpublic
when he traded on it. Ruling for the Government in this case would
respect Dirks. Furthermore, the Court can clarify what the “personal
benefit” theory entails and protect the policies behind insider trading
criminality. However, there does need to be a clear limiting principle
on downstream liability. Finally, Salman can be read not to conflict with
Newman, if the Court finds that Newman can be distinguished from this
case for lack of a quid pro quo.
A. The Plain Meaning of Dirks Requires the Court to Affirm Salman’s
Conviction
Based on Dirks, the Court should define personal benefit in two
ways. First, a personal benefits occurs when there is a quid pro quo,
which may be monetary or any advantage or profit the insider receives.
Second, when the insider and the tippee are so intimately connected by
their relationship, the information provided is per se a personal benefit.
146. See id. at 47 (explaining how Dirks rejected a rule that would make it illegal to use
confidential information in securities trading just because the counterparty did not have access to
that information).
147. Id. at 48.
148. Id. at 49.
149. Id. at 49–50.
150. See id. at 52.
151. See id. at 49.
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The Court ruled in Dirks that insider trading occurs when the
disclosure is fraudulent, meaning it deceives or defrauds
shareholders.152 The court must look at “objective criteria, i.e., whether
the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the
disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain[,] or a reputational benefit that will
translate into future earnings.”153 In Dirks, the Court discusses two
scenarios that could lead a reasonable juror to infer a personal benefit
was gained, like (1) a relationship suggesting quid pro quo, or (2) when
the information is given as a gift to a “trading relative or friend.”154 This
leads directly to the two forms of personal benefit the Court should
adopt.
These elements are clearly present in this case. It is not contested
that Maher and Michael were close. As the Ninth Circuit observed,
even if Salman did not know all of the details of the Kara brothers’
relationship, as a close friend and family member, a reasonable juror
could infer that he knew Maher’s tips to Michael were predicated on
Maher’s intention to receive a benefit.155 Salman then received the
information from Michael. Based on Michael’s testimony, the
Government proved that Salman both knew where the information
came from, and that it was nonpublic. Therefore, following the plain
language of Dirks, Salman’s conviction should be upheld.
Salman contends that the judgment cannot stand on the
Government’s non-purpose theory because it did not go to the jury.156
The Court, however, does not need to define a new standard. The Court
may uphold the conviction based on Dirks, which did go to the jury in
this case. If the Court does choose to adopt a “non-corporate purpose”
definition of “personal benefit,” however, the conviction can still stand.
Arguably, the Government did not provide an alternative, novel
standard.157 Rather, it clarified “personal benefit,” a term already used,
to prevent the ambiguity that has caused confusion in this case.158
Finally, the Court could also uphold Salman’s conviction under
Dirks by alternatively defining “personal benefit.” An example of this
152. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 664.
155. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2015).
156. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 24.
157. See Brief for the United States, supra note 129, at 40 (explaining that the Dirks standard
is unambiguous and does not require a new theory).
158. See id. at 19 (defining personal benefit as corporate purpose).
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would be a “gift theory,” in which the tipper does not benefit in a
tangible way, but he is incentivized to disclose information in order to
bestow a gift to the tippee.159 Accordingly, the tippee would only need
to know that the tipper’s motivation was some personal benefit, which
under this theory would be the satisfaction of giving a gift.160 This
theory also does not change the Dirks standard; it clarifies it. Therefore,
the jury was properly instructed. The Government can maintain
Salman’s conviction because he knew that Maher gifted the
information to Michael and that Maher breached his duty, but Salman
still traded on it.
B. The Policies Behind Insider Trading Liability Support the
Government’s Position
Allowing Salman to trade on material nonpublic information he
obtained in this way contradicts the policies undergirding into Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Salman’s knowledge is unfair to consumers
because he knows that the information came from Maher, an insider. If
the Court were to follow Salman’s argument, it would provide a
mechanism through which an insider can escape prosecution by
providing money to her family members as long as the insider does not
receive any money back, even if she receives an intangible benefit.161
However, the benefit to the insider alone is not what makes insider
trading unfair, or else anyone who does well playing the stock market
has a problem. Rather, insider trading is unfair because a fiduciary duty
was breached by disclosure.162 Therefore, if personal benefit means
receiving any valuable benefit back, or having a relationship where
helping the tippee automatically helps the insider, the underlying
purpose of the law is protected.
Salman’s argument that a pecuniary benefit standard is enough to
cover inside traders misses a huge group of individuals that Dirks
covered. For example, those who trade information in exchange for
their child’s admission to a prestigious college would be free from
liability. Under the Government’s “lack of corporate purpose test,”
these people are now liable. However, the Government’s theory
ignores reasons why information should be disclosed, even if it goes
159. Katherine Drummonds, Resuscitating Dirks: How the Salman Gift Theory of TipperTippee Personal Benefit Would Improve Insider Trading Law, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV., 833, 849
(2016).
160. Id.
161. Brief for the United States, supra note 129, at 48.
162. Cohen, supra note 71, at 550.
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against the wishes of the corporation, like whistleblowing. Someone
who seeks to report a company’s wrongdoings to help authorities is
acting against the company in sharing material non-public
information.163 But prosecuting him for this disclosure is counterintuitive because he provides a social good.164 To avoid these types of
issues, the Court should use the two standards in Dirks but with
clarified definitions of (1) a quid pro quo situation or (2) specific close
relationships, such as family and close friends. This provides a way to
curb liability, while protecting the reasons insider trading is illegal in
the first instance.
C. Newman can be Distinguished from the Case at Bar
The Court can uphold Salman’s conviction without overturning
Newman. Salman and Newman differ on their facts, specifically the
relationship between tippee and tipper.165 In Newman, the Second
Circuit ruled that the career advice that the tipper had received and the
fact that the tipper and tippee attended the same church, were too
attenuated to constitute the relationship Dirks required.166
Instead of reading Newman as a departure from Dirks, it can be
looked at as a recognition of Dirks’ limits and an “attempted
clarification.”167 It can therefore be argued that Salman falls within the
limits of “personal benefit,” while Newman stands outside. In fact, the
Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]o the extent Newman can be read to go so
far, we decline to follow it.”168 Therefore, a true circuit split was not
created;169 the Ninth Circuit simply rejected Salman’s interpretation of
Newman.170 In Newman, there was no quid pro quo nor was the
relationship between the tipper and tippee, as church acquaintances,
enough to meet the standard suggested here. Salman, however, meets
the element based on the relationship in the case.

163. See e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648–50 (1983).
164. Id. at 665–67.
165. John L. Potapchuk, The Sky is Not Falling, Todd Newman: The Ninth Circuit Endorses
a Measured Reading of Newman’s Definition of Personal Benefit for Insider Trading Liability in
United States v. Salman, 57 B.C. L. REV. 139, 154 (2016).
166. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
167. Potapchuck, supra note 165, at 142.
168. United States v. Salman, 792, F.3d 1087, 1093 (2015).
169. Potapchuk, supra note 165, at 158.
170. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The decision in Salman v. United States will be, at its core, a question
of what constitutes a “personal benefit” to the insider. The Court
should rule that a personal benefit can be (1) a quid pro quo situation
or (2) defined close relationships such as family and close friends. Here,
because the insider passed on the information to his brother, who then
shared the information with his close friend and relative, the Court will
likely rule for the Government. The Court’s ruling should clarify some
of the ambiguity surrounding insider trading standards while upholding
the policy goals so clearly at stake in securities fraud cases.
While this would help clarify some of the ambiguity in determining
insider trading liability, it will not solve everything. Even in this case,
the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to Salman’s second
question: whether willful blindness is applicable in insider trading171 If
willful blindness is accepted as a theory of liability, it may have negative
implications on securities fraud.172 However, barring the use of willful
blindness also provides a loophole where the government cannot
prosecute a trader who avoids learning the source of a tip. These
questions will need to be decided in the future as insider trading
litigation continues to proliferate.

171. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19, at 9.
172. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).

